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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHARLES ALVIN KENNEDY, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-v-
L_;\·~REt::::E '10RRIS, Warden, 
Ctch State Prison 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 17617 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant appeals from the denial of his petition 
:x a writ of habeas corpus, brought in the Third Judicial 
D:strict Court, in and for Salt Lake County, the Honorable 
ccinstine M. Durham, presiding. Appellant sought post-
c:ir . .'ictio'1 relief from the judgment and sentence imposed upon 
r.:;i after being convicted of forcible sexual abuse. 
DISPOSITION IX THE LOWER COURT 
On February 11, 1981, the district court, after 
c:co:.~er1ng the oral arguments and 1,-ri t ten memoranda subrni tted 
c~· t:·.~ r·2s:)ect ive parties, ar.6 after considering the 
~: 0 .~2::-i~t of ti1e trial, denied appellant's petition for a 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
writ of habeas corpus. The court founded its decision 00 ~f 
ground that appellant was not denied his right to the 
effective assistance of counsel and that appellant did not 
meet his burden of showing that his waiver of trial by jury 
was involuntary or unknowing (R. 34, 35). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the decision of the , 
district court denying appellant's petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Appellant is inc a rce ra tec1 at the Utah State Prison, 
serving two concurrent sentences of zero to five years for 
conviction of two counts of forcible sexual abuse, imposed by 
the Honorable Allen B. Sorenson, Judge presiding in the Fifth 
Judicial District Court, Juab County. The charge 11as based on 
petitioner's causing other persons to take indecent liberties 
with petitioner's wife with the intent to arouse the 
petitioner's sexual desires. 
l\ppellant appealed his conviction to this Court, 
which affirmed the judgment of the district court in state v. 
Kennedy, Utah, 616 P.2d 588 (1980). 
-2-
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In his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, 
ot'pellant alleged that he did not knowingly and voluntarily 
',:aivE: his right to be tried by a jury, and that he was denied 
his right to effective assistance of counsel at trial (R. 
~-~), In the instant appeal, appellant alleges only that he 
cici not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to trial by 
jury. 
Greg Warner, of the Utah County Legal Defender's 
c1:':'1ce, was appointed to represent appellant in connection 
··"·iu th<: charge of forcible sexual abuse (T. 4), On September 
l~, j_9/S, a Freliminary hearing was held, resulting in 
c.;:,;.ej_lant' s be:..ng bounc over to stand trial in the Fourth 
JJc1cial District Court for Juab County. Mr. Warner filed 
s2:2ra: pce-trial motions in the matter, including a Motion to 
~Jes:~ ::ir Dismiss and a '•otion to Sever (T. 10, 11). Mr. 
::sr:ier met personally ·~·ith appellant to discuss the motions 
c.~.~ tcial strategy on :ive separate occasions (T. 6, 7, 23). 
~~1:ionally, Mr. Wacnec contacted appellant by telephone 
~Jr 2r0us tic,es. 
~:ter condu:ting an investigation of the case, Mr. 
::2c"1er formc:lo.ted a basic plan as to how he \'IOuld proceed at 
He explained to appellant that appellant did not have 
,, ~~s:i::y, that he hac a right to a jury tcial, and that 
~ .,_·~ 1·e::-e t.:0 charges against appellant. Arlditionally, 'lr. 
-3-
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Warner felt it would be better to have the matter tried befor, 
a judge rather than before a jury and explained to appellant 
that this was a decision that appellant did not have to make 
at that time (T.8-10). Mr. Warner, in his initial explanatior 
to appellant of his right to a jury trial, told appellant tho: 
he had a right to a jury trial, and that in order for that 
right to be waived, appellant would have to decide to waive 1: 
and then waive the right on the record at trial (T. 14). 
Prior to the filing of the Motion to Sever in 
November, 1979, Mr. Warner suggested to appellant that he 
waive a jury trial, though he was uncertain whether appellant 
would do so. Appellant told Mr. warner to go ahead and make 
the choice whether to waive the jury, but Mr. Warner responded 
that the choice was not his to make and that appellant would 
have to agree to the waiver of a jury trial on the reco~. 
Mr. Warner had already told appellant that the role of the 
jury was that of a fact finder, that the jury had to be 
unanimous in its decision to convict him of the charges, and 
that the jury must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt as 
to his guilt. Appellant told ~lr. warner to use his (\·;arner•s: 
best discretion in the matter of the waiver of the jury trial 
(T. 11, 12, 14, 15). 
on November 21, 1979, Mr. warner appeared before 
the Honorable Allen B. Sorenson, Judge of the Fourth Judicial 
-4-
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oistrict, on the Motion to Sever. Appellant was not present. 
It '.·~r. \~arner indicated that appellant was willing to waive a 
e j jury trial. Judge Sorenson indicated that appellant would 
io' ! have to make such waiver on the record (T. 12, 13). 
On November 24, 1979, Mr. Warner had a lengthy 
s1scussion with appellant at the Juab County Jail. During 
i: t~is discussion, Mr. Warner indicated that a tentative 
decision had been reached to have a bench trial. Mr. Warner 
a:so indicatej that if appellant wished to change his mind, 
·:r. i·;arner woJld call Judge Sorenson, have a jury trial set, 
o-.c litigate the Motion to Sever (T. 16). Mr. v:arner did not 
"" t:J ap_c,ellant, as alleged by appellant, that he (\varner) 
.~cc 1·.'aivec the jury and that appellant had no chance of having 
2 ~ J ry trial ( T . 5 3 ) • 
Khile appellant testified at the habeas corpus 
'"2ring in the lower court that he had had no discussions with 
orner regarding either his right to a jury trial or 
""":er o: that right be:ore the Motion to sever was heard on 
~979, Mr. ~arner testified that he did indeed 
'-':~ss 1.itf-. o~':lellant ::;:e wai.\-er of a jury trial before 
.:·~r.oer 21, J.979, as evidenced by the following colloquy at 
tearing between hi~self and State's counsel: 
Q: You hearj ~r. Kennedy testify that he never 
discussed waiving the jury with you before 
-~-
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A: 
that November 21st hearing. Do you still der .. 
that is the case? 
Yes, I certainly do. It would be totally 
ridiculous for me to go down the day of trial 
and say we are going to waive the jury and 
then, you know, have a defendant not go alon~ 
with it. 
Mr. Kennedy is a very forceful person. If th-- . 
'i is what he thinks is his best interest, 
certainly would not even think, aside from 
ethics, just the practicality, would never 
indicate to the court that my client was 
willing to do that on the record if I had not 
conferred regarding that with him prior to 
that (T. 52). 
The transcript of the proceedings at appellant's trial on 
November 27, 1979 shows that appellant waived his right to 
trial by jury in open court, and that such waiver was recordec 
in the minutes ( T. 18, 19). 
In a me;norandum decision on appel2-ant's petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus, the lower court ruled that 
appellant was not denied his right to the effective assistancE 
of counsel and that appellant did not meet his burden of 
showing that his waiver of trial by jury was either 
involuntary or unknowing (R. 34). 
-6-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED 
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS 
CORPUS BECAUSE APPELLANT DID NOT MEET HIS 
BURDEN OF SHOWING THAT HIS WAIVER OF A 
JURY TRIAL v;As EITHER INVOLUNTARY OR 
UNKNOWING. 
While it is axiomatic that the right to trial by 
jJr:· in crirr,inal cases is a fundamental constitutional right, 
:~ is also well established that an accused may waive his 
c2r5tituti0nal right to a trial by jury as long as such waiver 
__ ~l-nta~y and intelligent. Patton v. United States, 281 
.:::. rs (1930); State 'I. Yeck, Utah, 566 P.2d 1248 (1977); 
3:c:e ·:. Kelsey, Ctah, 532 P.2d 1001 (1975). In the seminal 
Coo'.' '.:l: Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S 145 (1966), in which the 
~·;.1 :e:J States Supreme Court held that the right to a jury 
:::101 is a fundamental constitutional right, the Supreme Court 
=-~'.' sta te:J: 
~e would not assert, however, that every 
criminal trial--or any particular trial--
held before a judge alone is unfair or 
that a defendant may never be as fairly 
c~eated by a judge as he would be b~ a 
p-·· :":ms .ve r.olc no constitutional 
~oJots 3b8~t the oractices, common i~ 
both federal and ~tate courts, of 
accepting waivers of jury trial. 
39i U.S. at 158. 
-7-
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In the landmark case of Adams v. United States ex 
rel. Mccann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942), the United States Supreme 
Court stated: 
[A]n accused, in the exercise of a 
free and intelligent choice, and with the 
considered approval of the court, may 
waive trial by jury, 
The Patton decision [281 u.s. 276 (1930)) 
left no room for doubt that a 
determination of guilt by a court after 
waiver of jury trial could not be set 
aside and a new trial ordered except upon 
a plain showing that such waiver was not 
freely and intelligently made. If the 
result of the adjudicatory process is not 
to be set at naught, it is not asking too 
much that the burden of showing essential 
unfairness be sustained by him who claims 
such injustice and seeks to have the 
result set aside, and that it be 
sustained not as a matter of speculation 
but as a demonstrable reality. Simply 
because a result that was insistently 
invited, namely, a verdict by a court 
without a jury, disappointed the hopes of 
the accused, ought not to be sufficient 
for rejecting it. 
317 U.S. 269, 275 (emphasis added). See also Dranow v. unitec 
States, 325 F.2d 481 (8th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 376 u.s. 
912 (1964). 
Respondent submits that appellant has not sho11n ao 
a demonstrable reality that his waiver of jury trial was 
involuntary or unknowing. Thus, he has not sustained his 
burden as noted above. 
-8-
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The statute concerning waiver of the right to jury 
tnal in effect at the time of petitioner's trial was Utah 
code Annotated, § 77-27-2 (1953), as amended, which provided: 
Issues of fact must be tried by a 
jury, but in all cases except where a 
sentence of death may be imposed, trial 
by jury may be waived by the defendant. 
Such waiver shall be made in open court 
and entered in the minutes. 
;~. appellant's case, tt:is statute was complied with since 
2~;:ellant stated on the record in open court that he waived 
:.:s rigbt to trial by :ury (T. 18, 19). 
Appellant argues, however, that he was 
"s.Jstantially and effectively denied his constitutional right 
~~ :rial by J'Jry" in tr.at he did not make "an intelligent, 
·:~.~ . .-~:-is, anc '.'Oluntary waiver" thereof (Appellant's brief at 
i, ~.:; 1. In attempting to substantiate his allegation, 
2:;:2:1=.nt contends that he was advised by his trial counsel, 
i :'.':"c~cry \i. \·;arner, on :·~ovember 24, 1979, just a few days , I 
c~:)r:e his trial, that :.1r. Warner had waived a jury in the 
:~>il, a'.1d that '1r. \·/arner had not previously discussed the 
Appellant also asserts that Mr. 
2~~e~ gave b~~ no exp:anation of the ~eaning or significance 
:s right to a jury trial, and that ~e t~erefore had no 
-~~s:anding of the rcle of the jury and t~e State's burden 
~roof in jury cases. Finally, appellant avers that the 
-9-
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trial judge failed to explain to him the full significance o: 
his right to trial by jury at the trial its elf. However, at 
the hearing Mr. Kennedy was unable to state what more ~ 
should have been told at or before trial concerning this rigr:: 
(T. 42, 45, 49). 
In the lower court's dee is ion denying appellant's 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Judge Durham determined 
that appellant did not meet his burden of showing that his 
waiver of trial by jury was involuntary or unknowing. 
'.'!oreover, Judge Durham ruled that appellant was not denied h;, 
right to the effective assistance of counsel because counsel 
was experienced and discussed all material tactical decisions 
with appellant (R. 34). 
In order to sustain his appeal from a denial of his 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, appellant has the burder 
of proving the grounds on which he relies for his release by 
evidence which is clear and convincing. McGuffey v. Turner, 
18 Utah 2d 354, 423 P.2d 166 (1967). There is a presumption 
t:hat the lower court did not commit error in its ruling. Lee 
v. Sheriff of Clark County, Nev., 455 P.2d 623 (1969). The 
unsupported statements of a petitioner in a habeas corpus 
proceeding do not meet the requirements of proof, Corn v · 
Page, Old. Cir., 428 P.2d 343 (1967), particularly because as 
this Court held in Maxwell v. Turner, 20 Utah 2d 163, 435 p,J; 
287 (1967), recognition is given to the prerogative and the 
advantaged position of the trial court and his finrlings and 
judgment are given a presumption of correctness. .l\S 
-10-
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:etermined in Maxwell, supra, the duty of this Court in 
:onsidering an appeal from a denial of a writ of habeas corpus 
15 to survey the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
0wer court's findings and judgment, which are not upset if 
:~re is any substantial support for them in the evidence. 
see also Price v. Turner, Utah, 502 P.2d 121 (1972); Velasquez 
:. '.'ratt, 21 Utah 2d 229, 443 p, 2d 1020 ( 1968); Brown v. 
~· 21 Utah 2d 96, 440 P.2d 968 (1968). 
Evidence presented by a habeas corpus petitioner 
n°ej not be taken as fact, and the trial court is not 
:~:i'.,Jel~ed to oelieve such evidence where there is anything 
o:oE it ,,;h~ch 11ould reasonably justify refusal to accept it 
'' tr.e facts, and this includes the self-interest of the 
,_::-,sss, ,"\2.so, this Co_irt has held that where an accused has 
~~e~ represented by a rr,er;iber of the bar in good standing, and 
'''sofar as the record discloses, the accused has been 
·-:~:esEnted in a diligent and capable manner, it is fair to 
,,,j,,-: that the attorney fulfilled his duties in other 
~csCJe:ts and advised tl:e accused concerning his rights. 
_-_.,_,,_,s_~_,_, ___ C:-'u-''r=-"-·-e_r, 24 :_:-:ah 2d -i39, 4-;-3 P.2d 901 (1970). 
In light of the foregoing standards, it is apparent 
,. scpel!ant has not sustained his burden of proving that he 
~ ~:~ ~a~:e an intelligent and l:nowing waiver of his right to 
~i3!. Judge Durharr found that appellant was not denied 
_ 1 1 _ 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the effective assistance of counsel, but was e r presented by 
competent, experienced counsel who discussed all tactical 
decisions with appellant. Appellant himself has tacitly 
acknowledged that he was given effective assistance of counse: 
by Mr. Warner because, in the instant matter, by not raising 
the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal, he 
has waived it. It is therefore fair to assume that Mr. warner 
advised appellant of his right to a jury trial, particularly 
in light of the record in the instant case. 
There is nothing in the record, save appellant's 
self-interested testimony, to show that Mr. Warner did not 
explain to appellant the meaning and significance of the ng'.'. 
to a jury trial before Mr. Warner appeared before Judge 
Sorenson on the Motion to Sever on November 21, 1979. It is 
merely appellant's self-interested assertion that he had not 
discussed and approved of the waiver of a jury trial with Mr. 
Warner before Mr. Warner indicated to Judge Sorenson that 
appellant was willing to waive a jury trial. Appellant also 
omits stating that Mr. Warner informed him on November 24, 
2-979, several days before trial, that the decision to 1,aive 
jury trial was only tentative, and that if appellant 1;ished t: 
change his mind, Mr. Warner would call Judge Sorenson and hai·e 
a jury trial set. 
-12-
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It is well settled in criminal law that the 
credibility of witnesses and the weight and consideration to 
be given to their testimony are within the exclusive province 
0 : tr.e trier of facts. Cowdill v. State, Okl. Cir. 532 P.2d 
63 (1975); Hall v. State, Nev., 513 P.2d 1244 (1975). 
4:Jcitionally, in the instant matter, the findings and judgment 
~ t~e trial court are presumed correct, particularly because 
2-:dence presented by a habeas corpus petitioner does not need 
t::i oe taken as fact where such evidence is inherently self-
i~,terested, and where, as in the instant matter, there is 
SJco':ant id support for Judge Durham's decision in the 
e·:i.5'°:-i:::e adduced at the hearing. Appellant has not met his 
OJ::'ie;; o::: proving that his waiver of a jury trial was 
ii·;')~Jnta:-y or unknm·;ing; and, in li9ht of the substantial 
e--ije:-ice on the record supporting Judge Durham's decision 
der.Ji:-ig appellant's petition (see Respondent's Statement of 
0 oc:3 at:J':e), this Court '11Ust sustain that decision. 
POINT I I 
IT IS NOT REQ~IRED THAT T~E TRI\L JUDGE 
·.:;..:;£ It\QL.I?.': SN THE RECORD OF .A!\ 
ACCl'SSD' s rz::o1:ING i",t'JD INTELLIGE'JT \iAIVER 
OF HIS RIGH~ TO A JURY TRIAL OR THAT THE 
TRIAL CO~RT HAVE A ~RITTEN WAIVER OF THAT 
RIGHT. 
-13-
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Appellant suggests that it was necessary for ~e 
trial judge to advise him of the full significance of his 
right to a jury trial or have a written waiver from appellant 
of the right to a jury trial. In her memorandum decision 
denying appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, 
Judge Durham rejected this contention: 
Defendant contends that the Court should 
have orally advised him about the 
significance of his right to a jury trial 
and should have required him to execute a 
written waiver after responding to 
questions about his understanding of the 
right and the waiver. Although such 
procedures are clearly desirable and 
useful, they do not appear to be 
constitutionally required. 
In this case defendant was specifically 
questioned as to his desire to waive the 
jury; he had an opportunity to tell the 
court directly if he objected to the 
waiver or was uncertain about any part of 
it. He personally assented to the 
waiver, and has not shown by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the 
waiver was unknowing or involuntary. It 
is significant in that regard that he 
raised no point vis a vis the jury trial 
waiver in the appeal of his conviction 
undertaken after trial (R. 34, 35). 
This Court, in several cases, has held that there 
valid waiver by a defendant of the rig~t to a JUry tri3: 
even where the defendant himself did not state that he waivec 
the right. In State v. Lopez, 22 Utah 2d 257, 451 P.2d 772 
( 1969), this Court found that it was enough that counsel 
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request that the case be tried without a jury, if that request 
,..·as rr.aoe in open court with the defendant standing by 
c0u~sel's side, stating: 
This meets requirement of § 77-27-2, 
u.c.A., 1953, which provides that the 
waiver of a jury must "be made in open 
court and entered in the minuted," and 
the record indicates with sufficient 
clarity that the right was waived • 
The matter of trial tactics is not the 
concern of the court, but of the 
defendant and his counsel. 
~cl F.Ld 772, 776. See also Barlow v. Young, 108 Utah 523, 
.oi F.2d 92-;- ( 1945). 
~ppellant ccntends that the federal rules, case 
":,,., 2nd Lie new Utah Fules of Criminal Procedure require that 
c:.s trc.al court must ma~e inc;uiry to ascertain 1·1hether waiver 
r :re accused is knowi'.1g, intelligent, and voluntary. Such a 
~~c:e~ure, t,u,,,ever, as Judge Durham determined, is not 
cJr.c:tit•Jtionally required. 
·.·tar. Code _;;r.:1otated, § 77-35-17(c) (1981 Supp.) 
>'2.s ·.:ith 1·:aiver by ar. accused of a jury trial and provides 
:: c:: 
:11 felony cases stall be tried b~ a jury 
~nless t~e de~endant waives a jury in 
ope~ court ~~th the approval of the court 
and the consent of the prosecution . 
. ~tJte does not require that the trial court make inquiry 
e·e~~1:1e whether tte defendant's waiver is knowing, 
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Even under the more restrictive Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, which require that the defendant sign a 
written waiver of the right to a jury trial (Rule 23), it has 
often been held that it is not necessary for the judge ~ 
interrogate the defendant in order to obtain a val id waiver, 
Estrada v. United States, 957 F.2d 255 (7th Cir. 1972). 
The United States Supreme Court, in Patton v. 
United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930), determined that a trial 
court has the power to try a criminal case without a jury 
where the accused waives a jury trial; and that the waiver ot 
a jury is ef feet i ve where the re is the sa net ion of the court, 
the consent of the government counsel, and the express and 
intelligent consent of the defendant. The Supreme Court, in 
Patton, established no requirement that the judge make inquire 
to determine that the accused's waiver of jury trial is 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. 
In Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), the 
Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the district court a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court, in 
cenying the petition, believed that the petitioner 11as 
deprived in the trial court of his constitutional right ~ 
counsel; but nevertheless held that the proceedings deprivina 
the petitioner of his right to counsel were insufficient to 
make the trial void and justify its annulment in a habeas 
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cor?us proceeding. The district court determined that such 
proceedings constituted trial errors or irregularities which 
could only be corrected on appeal. In its decision, the 
supreme Court determined that a habeas corpus petitioner bears 
a r,eavy burden of proof to convince the court hearing his 
~ti~ion that he did not properly waive such a fundamental 
cor.stitutional right: 
It must be remembered, however, that 
a judgment cannot be lightly set aside by 
collateral attack, even on habeas corpus. 
When collaterally attacked, the judgment 
of a court carries with it a presumption 
of regularity. Where a defendant, 
without counsel, acquiesces in a trial 
resulting in his conviction and later 
seeks release by the extraordinary remedy 
of habeas corpus, the burden of proof 
rests upon r.im to establish that he did 
not completely and intelligently waive 
his constitutional right to assistance of 
counsel. . If petitioner fails to 
sustain this burden, he is not entitled 
to the writ (304 U.S. at 468, 469). 
kS noted in Point I above, appellant, having failed 
:: ·~·.cc: his heavy burden of proof, may not now allege that the 
'.~isl court errec1 in net making inquiry to determine whether 
-~~ver -:if ~_1;:y triel 1.•as kno11in(J, intelligent, and 
Nor ~ay apfellant rely on his inherently self-
-·.rc::-cstec c:estimony on this appeal to establish that his 
:·:c::standing of the role of ti1e jury was limited and that 
::·c:·=~:ne :-,1s waiver of jury trial was somewhat less than 
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1 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, particularly where 
substantial, credible evidence was adduced showing that 
appellant did indeed knowingly and intelligently waive a jury 
trial. 
The cases relied on by appellant do not, as ~ 
alleges, require either a writing to waive the accused's rigr:: 
to a jury trial or an inquiry of the accused by the trial 
judge to determine that the waiver by the accused is knowi~ 
and intelligent. 
In State v. Christean, Utah, 533 P.2d 872 (19751, 
the defendant contended that he did not knowingly waive his 
right to a jury trial because, having been charged with a 
capital offense and thereby being entitled to a twelve-man 
jury, he was erroneously asked by the trial court whether he 
understood that he would have to be found guilty by the 
unanimous verdict of eight jurors. This Court held that since 
the defendant had been thoroughly examined by defense counsel 
as to whether he (defendant) understood the consequences of 
waiving a trial by jury and had waived this right prior to the 
erroneous question by the trial court, he could not allege 
that his waiver was unknowing. In Christean, there was no 
mention by this Court that the trial court is required to 
independently inquire into a defendant's knowing and 
intelligent waiver of a jury trial. 
-18-
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In Hayes v. State, Okl. Cir., 541 P.2d 210 (1975), 
the court discussed how one accused of a crime may effectuate 
a valid waiver of trial by jury, suggesting that the better 
practice is for the accused to waive trial by jury personally 
and ir, open court either orally or in writing, and at that 
:une for the trial judge to make inquiry of the accused to 
ass·Jre in the judge's rr.ind that the waiver is expressly and 
intelligently made. Tte court, however, did not require such 
a.-i ir.quiry by the trial judge, and suggested that an accused's 
r~q~,t to trial by jury may also be waived either when he and 
_s c::i~msel are present in open court and the accused stands 
:o;· o.r.d allo\:s counsel to waive jury trial in his behalf, or 
,:".e1 counsel for an accused, outside the accused's presence, 
·«1ai·es t''e accused's right to trial by jury, unless the 
a:cJsed presents evider.ce to show that he did not ratify the 
""ai .. er in any manner. 
K}Jpellant's attempt to rely on the federal cases of 
:icCart~.y v. United States, 394 u.s. 549 (1969), and Heiden v. 
·:,,i:t:d States, 353 F. 2ci 53 (9th Cir. 1965) is also misplaced. 
~ 0 ~ cast:s deal with FJ~e 11 of the Federal Rules of Cri~inal 
)r::•ej~re, \·:hich recuires specifically that the court :nay not 
0:c 2 '.='- a ouilty plea or a plea of nolo contendere without 
=~2r~s~i""lc the defendar.: personally and determining that the 
::ca is ~ad'= vcluntaril:· h'ith understanding of the nature of 
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the charge and the consequences of the plea. There is no 
requirement that a trial judge, in allowing a defendant ~ 
waive his right to a jury trial, inquire on the record as tc 
the knowing and intelligent nature of the waiver. In 
addition, respondent submits that there was much evidence 
adduced at the hearing on appellant's petition to show th~ 
appellant did indeed knowingly and voluntarily waive his a~ 
to a jury trial. 
There is no constitutional mandate that an accusec 
execute a written waiver of his right to trial by jury oc t~ 
the trial court make inquiry on the record of an accused 
regarding his knowing and intelligent waiver of a jury tnal. 
Appellant therefore may not validly contend, as he attempts t: 
do in his Point V, that the transcript and record of his 
habeas corpus hearing do not establish that his waiver of jur: 
trial was not knowing and voluntary. Appellant ~tated on the 
record that he waived his right to a jury trial, and there'''° 
reasonable adherence to the federal mdndates regarding waiver 
of the right to a jury trial in the trial and subsequent 
hearing on appellant's petition. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant has not ;net his burden of showing that 
his waiver of trial by jury was involuntary or unknowing. 
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;jr·;eying the record in the light most favorable to the 
:indings and judgment of the lower court, there is substantial 
e·:dence to support the judgment. Appellant has not, simply 
t~rcugh his self-interested testimony and assertions, shown 
thct he is entitled to a reversal of the judgment. There is 
no constitutional requirement that the appellant's waiver of 
:!:'i:il by =ury be written or that the trial court make inquiry 
0 ,. :~.e record as to his kno11ing and intelligent waiver 
:".ece'.lf. In light of the foregoing facts, case law, and 
s: 2 t~:es, respondent prays that this Court affirm the decision 
DATED this 28th day of October, 1981. 
Respectfully submitted, 
~~~-o)W 
ROBERT N. PARRISH 
Assistant Attorney General 
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